Nijhawan-inspired hypotheticals
Before looking at some of the ideas from the Nijhawan oral argument, let's look at some hypotheticals.
First, does it seem unjust and contrary to what Congress must have been thinking to punish two people differently because the states where they committed their crimes define the criminal statutes differently? Let's say someone in State A commits a fraud that causes $15,000 of harm and is punished for committing what State A defines as "theft causing more than $11,000 in damage." That'd be an aggravated felony as a conviction for a crime causing more than $10,000 in loss. Someone in State B, however, commits a similar fraud but State B defines its crime as "theft causing more than $10 in damage" so in some situations, that is not an aggravated felony because the conviction is not for a crime causing more than $10,000 in loss -- it's defined as a fraud causing more than $10 in damage. Is this unjust to such a degree that Congress could not have meant it?
Second, would it seem equally unjust and contrary to what Congress must have intended to punish two people differently because the states where they committed their crimes impose sentences differently? Imagine that State A sentences a certain violent crime with 13 months in jail but State B sentences the same violent crime with 11 months in jail? It's possible that the person sentenced to 13 months in jail has an aggravated felony but the person sentenced to 11 months in jail does not have an aggravated felony. Does this seem so unjust that it must be contrary to what Congress intended?
Third, would it seem unjust and contrary to what Congress must have intended to punish two people differently because the crimes are punished differently due to circumstances that are not part of the criminal statute, not part of the conviction, and were out of the criminal's control? Let's say someone in State A, someone in State B, and someone in State C each obtain by fraud a $1 lottery ticket whose drawing will be done 7 weeks later. In each state, they are convicted of fraud whereby they stole a $1 ticket and deprived the owner of the value of that ticket. After the convictions are final in each state, the ticket in State A turns out to be worth $0 (it doesn't win), the ticket in State B turns out to be worth $9,500 (it wins a minor prize), and the ticket in State C turns out to be worth $20,000 (it wins one of the major prizes). Would you say that Congress absolutely must have intended to punish the three thieves differently based on the result of the lottery drawing that did not take place until 7 weeks after the fraud and a few weeks after the convictions? Would you say that Congress must have intended for the fraudster in States A and B not to have aggravated felonies but the fraudster in State C must be treated as committing an aggravated felony?
First, does it seem unjust and contrary to what Congress must have been thinking to punish two people differently because the states where they committed their crimes define the criminal statutes differently? Let's say someone in State A commits a fraud that causes $15,000 of harm and is punished for committing what State A defines as "theft causing more than $11,000 in damage." That'd be an aggravated felony as a conviction for a crime causing more than $10,000 in loss. Someone in State B, however, commits a similar fraud but State B defines its crime as "theft causing more than $10 in damage" so in some situations, that is not an aggravated felony because the conviction is not for a crime causing more than $10,000 in loss -- it's defined as a fraud causing more than $10 in damage. Is this unjust to such a degree that Congress could not have meant it?
Second, would it seem equally unjust and contrary to what Congress must have intended to punish two people differently because the states where they committed their crimes impose sentences differently? Imagine that State A sentences a certain violent crime with 13 months in jail but State B sentences the same violent crime with 11 months in jail? It's possible that the person sentenced to 13 months in jail has an aggravated felony but the person sentenced to 11 months in jail does not have an aggravated felony. Does this seem so unjust that it must be contrary to what Congress intended?
Third, would it seem unjust and contrary to what Congress must have intended to punish two people differently because the crimes are punished differently due to circumstances that are not part of the criminal statute, not part of the conviction, and were out of the criminal's control? Let's say someone in State A, someone in State B, and someone in State C each obtain by fraud a $1 lottery ticket whose drawing will be done 7 weeks later. In each state, they are convicted of fraud whereby they stole a $1 ticket and deprived the owner of the value of that ticket. After the convictions are final in each state, the ticket in State A turns out to be worth $0 (it doesn't win), the ticket in State B turns out to be worth $9,500 (it wins a minor prize), and the ticket in State C turns out to be worth $20,000 (it wins one of the major prizes). Would you say that Congress absolutely must have intended to punish the three thieves differently based on the result of the lottery drawing that did not take place until 7 weeks after the fraud and a few weeks after the convictions? Would you say that Congress must have intended for the fraudster in States A and B not to have aggravated felonies but the fraudster in State C must be treated as committing an aggravated felony?
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